The Disappearance of the Military s "Order No. 1" and Zhang Youxia s Placement After He Weidong—Is It False

Chinese paramilitary police stand guard at Tiananmen Square. (China Photos/Getty Images)

People News - Since 2018, at the start of each year until 2022, it was customary for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leader and Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), Xi Jinping, to issue Order No. 1 of the Central Military Commission. This order served as a training mobilization directive for the entire military and was prominently reported by CCP state media and military outlets.

For instance, Xinhua News reported that on the morning of January 3, 2018, the CMC held a grand training mobilization meeting, where Xi Jinping, in full military attire, issued the command to the entire military. He called on the armed forces to "implement the spirit of the 19th Party Congress and the Party's new-era strong military thought, comprehensively strengthen combat-oriented military training, and fully enhance the capability to win wars." At the time, Xi presented a commanding and imposing image.

In another example, Xinhua News on January 4, 2021, reported that Xi Jinping had signed Order No. 1 of the CMC for 2021, issuing a training mobilization directive to the entire military. The report highlighted that this marked "the fourth consecutive year in which the commander-in-chief personally issued the training mobilization order, establishing a clear direction for focusing on military training and sounding the clarion call for preparing troops for combat in the new era." It also emphasized loyalty to Xi, stating that the military must follow "Xi's thought" as a guiding principle.

On January 4, 2022, Xi Jinping again signed Order No. 1 of the CMC, issuing the training mobilization directive. The first sentence declared, "I order: The 2022 military training begins." At least on the surface, this showcased Xi's "core" status within the military.

However, Order No. 1 was conspicuously absent in both 2023 and 2024. This likely correlates with the corruption scandals involving the Rocket Force and the investigations of two successive defense ministers. The continued absence of Order No. 1 this year is most likely tied to reports of Xi's health issues that surfaced after the Third Plenum in July 2023. These developments may have led to the gradual erosion of Xi's control over military power.

Based on various signals and information released by the Chinese military and the CCP over the past six months, it seems evident that Xi Jinping's power is weakening, and his control over the military is eroding. The first vice chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), Zhang Youxia, is reportedly taking control of the military with the backing of CCP elders.

However, some overseas analysts hold a contrary view, suggesting that Xi still maintains control over the military or has reached a compromise with Zhang Youxia. A prominent example they cite is a recent report by CCTV on the CCP Politburo's democratic life meeting held from December 26 to 27, 2024. In this report, Zhang Youxia was ranked after another CMC vice chairman, He Weidong. These analysts interpret this as a "signal of a power structure adjustment within the CCP leadership."

However, Zhang Youxia's placement after He Weidong in the report merely follows the convention of ranking Politburo members alphabetically based on the strokes in their surnames. This ranking order is not indicative of any significant change in power dynamics. The Politburo's democratic life meeting at the end of December 2023 followed a similar ranking, with Zhang Youxia also listed after He Weidong. The order presented in official media is consistent with the alphabetical ranking of Politburo members, as officially disclosed: Ma Xingrui, Wang Yi, Yin Li, Shi Taifeng, Liu Guozhong, Li Ganjie, Li Shulei, Li Hongzhong, He Weidong, He Lifeng, Zhang Youxia, Zhang Guoqing, Chen Wenqing, Chen Jining, Chen Miner, Yuan Jiajun, and Huang Kunming.

Thus, drawing the conclusion that Xi Jinping still controls the military solely based on this ranking lacks credibility. On the contrary, mounting evidence suggests that Xi’s authority over the military and the party has been stripped or weakened. This includes the disappearance of all personal photographs from the bookshelf behind Xi during his New Year’s address—a departure from a tradition maintained for at least the past seven years.

Other recent signals include:

  1. The purge of Xi’s trusted allies in the military: Several key figures have been removed or investigated, including Miao Hua (Director of the CMC Political Work Department) and Qin Shutong (Political Commissar of the Army). Reportedly, Yuan Huazhi, Wang Chunning, and Lin Xiangyang have also been detained for investigation.

  2. The appointment of Qin Yunbiao as Beijing’s new deputy mayor and head of the Public Security Bureau: Qin has no known ties to Xi’s faction.

  3. The removal of Xi loyalist Lou Yangsheng from his post as the top official in Henan Province.

  4. Military learning sessions on CMC political meetings and the Third Plenum: These sessions made little mention of Xi, which contrasts sharply with previous years.

Given the signs of Xi’s weakening authority in the latter half of 2024, it is highly likely that his power will be fully stripped in 2025. This could become even more probable with the inauguration of Donald Trump as U.S. president in January, which would bring significant pressure on the CCP. The combination of challenges from within the party, the public, and the military may lead to major upheavals within the CCP leadership. Let us wait and see. 

(Published first by People News)